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Source: Haus der Geschichte, Bonn. Author: Peter Leger. Even before the strikes in August , Der Spiegel asked whether the crisis in Poland would lead to similar social unrest as had occurred in , , and and whether it would provoke a nervous Soviet reaction and intervention. These questions were asked in when the crisis and resistance against the communist authorities continued to grow This question also kept recurring in subsequent months and years. The Prague Spring continued to recur as a reference point because it was a pre-Solidarity crisis which had shaken the Soviet bloc.

This gave rise to making associations between the two and thus to questions regarding the earlier intervention in Czechoslovakia and its possible repetition in Poland. Comparisons were made, between the situation of the two democratic movements in the Eastern bloc in an attempt to draw a conclusion as to whether the threats from Moscow may materialise, which is to say, whether it was possible that Moscow would react to Solidarity in the same manner as it had done to the Prague Spring. The intervention was perceived primarily as a mechanism aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the Eastern bloc.

The change was too small to form a conclusion that the anti-Semitic campaign had been interrupted, but it was perceptible. In , the emigration of the Jews from Poland continued. It was not only closely observed both by the diplomats and the mass media but was also watched with great attention in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Immediately following the events of March, anti-Semitism was considered as an element of the policy on the part of the authorities in Warsaw and as a tool of the intra-party power struggle.

Then, it was even more strongly associated with the issue of anti-Semitism in Poland. Related disputes escalated in late and early During that time, the international context also changed. In , the attention of the media and diplomats was focused on the events in Czechoslovakia and the policy on the part of Moscow. The wave of emotions after the intervention slowly calmed down, sanctions were discontinued and attempts were made to return to the politics of detente. In March , the Declaration of Budapest 17th March , which appealed for a European Security Conference to be set up, was published.

The policy of European states aimed at this direction. The successive escalation of anti-Semitic speeches and of emigration from Poland attracted the attention of the international public opinion. After being dampened down in July, the recurrence of the anti-Semitic rhetoric in Poland had already been noted by observers after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It resulted in the number of Jews leave the country, which increased to around two hundred per month In this assessment, the propaganda disseminated by the Polish authorities attempted to marginalise the accusations of anti-Semitism, to present them as tendentious and slanderous and to draw the attention to other issues.

Its authors quoted part of a Polish Radio programme from 3rd December Now, when certain signs of detente can be seen both in Europe as a whole, as well as between Poland and Western Germany, they are put at risk in order to poison the new climate. It is known who is set on this and who is, in fact, exploiting this campaign. It also quoted another Polish Radio programme, this time from 19th December, which emphasised the threat to the detente in Europe in even stronger terms: [ According to the Polish press, the general attack on Poland in the Western media was a planned and well-organised campaign rather than an accident The study quoted here claimed that, under the approach adopted by the Polish propaganda, Poland was unable to accept the accusations of anti-Semitism articulated in Germany.

According to Warsaw, the Germans had already levelled such allegations against the Poles during the barbaric German occupation. Now, when swastikas were being painted on synagogues in the FRG, attempts were being made to divert attention from the racism existing in the FRG itself. Opponents of the recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers were being equated with those who accused Poland of anti-Semitism.

It consisted of discrediting the Western journalists who criticised the discrimination against the Jews in Poland. The Foreign Ministry in Bonn did not quite know how to react to the events in Poland and the commentaries on them published in the West German media. On the one hand, it was not possible to ignore the indignation of Western public opinion, which was, of course, particularly visible in the media.

The article referred to here is A. In the summary, he emphasised that, [ The reaction of the largest part of the Polish public opinion is, at its best, indifferent; in its majority, however, it supports [the emigration of the Jews — PM]. Moreover, he clearly called Bonn to approve the emigration to the FRG for those wishing to leave. This would certainly have required a departure from the standard procedures, as the consideration of a visa application was a lengthy process Reich ziehen. He had, however, put the anti-Jewish purges to an end, apart from the one which took place in the Ministry of the Interior.

The report went on to say that, in June , under the pressure exerted by the so-called Partisans, he had come to the conclusion that he would have to use political anti-Semitism himself as a tool in the power struggle; this, however, provided the Partisans with an impulse to launch the anti- -Zionist campaign. This resulted in the purges in every area of social and political life, albeit that they did not affect everyone of Jewish origin.

The little time left by the authorities between the issue of a travel document and its expiry date made the formal obtaining of a visa to the states of the West impossible. In this situation, it was the Danish and Swedish authorities who were extending a helping hand Moreover, he suggested that any comparisons to the III Reich were exaggerated, bearing in mind that they were being applied to Poland where, after an end was put to the most radical part of the campaign in , subtler forms of discrimination, often invisible to an observer remaining on the outside, were brought into play in order to compel people to emigrate.

Apart from that, the authorities could count on support on the part of the majority of society. From 46 Ibidem. The problem of Polish anti- Semitism was to recur, however, even after , which is to say, after the ruling group in Warsaw changed. This emerged, inter alia, in , when the thirtieth anniversary of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto was commemorated. The commemoration did not trigger emotions comparable to those which had arisen earlier.

The reporter described this as a mark of a new climate, wherein such insinuations now resulted in a court trial rather than persecution by the secret services and emigration. However, these issues failed to disappear from the media, which continued to persist as a thorn in their reports from Poland. The disturbances were quelled by militia units and volunteers from among the army reservists, the so-called worker activists.

Feierlichkeiten aus Anlass des The impact of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland on the forming of negative stereotypes of the country cannot be seen in a number of historical studies either. The entry in Russian is written in what is, essentially, the same tone. Only a reference to the Moczar movement and his using of the anti-Zionist campaign can be found in the Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert. Europa nad dem Zweiten Weltkrieg series, Frankfurt am Main pp. Firstly, the manipulation by the communists of anti-Semitism in order to channel social discontent and maintain their grip on the helm of power, and secondly, a democratic protest quelled by force The impact of this ideology on society is also 56 Cf.

The author refers to the conclusions reached by Marcin Zaremba and Dariusz Stola. Barbara J. The anti- -Semitic hue-and-cry after March is only one of the links included in a markedly longer process. Nevertheless, she wrote of the resistance of certain social groups to the anti-Semitic propaganda.

These articles have been infrequent, but in general, they have reported on the debate in Poland about the problem of anti-Semitism in a positive tone Michael Ludwig criticised the Polish authorities for their lengthy inability to cope with the provocative erecting of the crosses in the Gravel Pit and their playing on anti-Semitic feelings.

He underscored the fact that this also holds true for a part of the political milieu that led Poland to liberation from the communist system, but which is unwilling to acknowledge that, in , Moczar was able to exploit the anti-Semitism existing in society The reservations which this article gave rise to a pattern whereby, in the lack of a readiness on the part of the society to look critically at its history, any gestures made by Polish politicians seem to be suspended in a vacuum.

See Appendix 2. Mengele o. On the other hand, the nine remaining Jewish communities are thriving. In , a Jewish primary school will be opened in Warsaw and a Jewish sports club will be set up. As far as a symbiosis of Jewish and Polish culture is concerned, it seems, however, irretrievably too late In Poland, the nationalist form of communism included a strong element of anti-Semitism, which, after , became visible both in the communist party and in the society. Initially it was not resorted to in the political power struggle.

This only occurred in the changed circumstances of the growing crisis in the second half of the sixties A precise description as to what the connections between the political plane of the events and the social reaction to them looked like was also not infrequently lacking in works which aspired to the ranks of historical studies An interest was awoken in stories describing the discovery of Jewish roots previously hidden and, sometimes, after the experience of , thoroughly concealed See Appendix 4. To all intents and purposes, the issue of those people of Jewish origin who, after the war and prior to their emigration, were actively involved in the building of the communist system, including its worst, Stalinist phase, did not appear in the press.

In this approach, Bauman is presented as being a victim of the system which he had helped to create. An article which predated it by a few years and was published in connection with his being awarded the Theodore W. The articles written by Helga Hirsch, describing individual cases but primarily showing one side of the events to a reader unfamiliar with the issues in question, were heavily loaded with emotions.

The fate of another person, Liliana Hausknecht81, was portrayed in a similar vein. The emigration in was even mentioned in the short announcement at the award ceremony Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, No. As Zoja, who prefers to see the things in a positive light, describes it, she is in love with the two countries at the same time. The last sentence referred, obviously, to the years of World War II. Hubert Torzecki described these events as being of key importance in the forming of an entire generation of people too young to remember the terror of the Stalin period, only a handful of whom were later to become involved in the opposition.

One can also come across the negation of this experience, when, departing from the emphasis being put on the connection between the rise, in the sixties, of nationalism and anti-Semitism85, a thesis was articulated to the effect that, in the eighties, the events of were pushed from the collective memory in Poland in order to make it possible for the national ideology, blamed for March, to become a counterbalance to communism by means of forgetting its connection with the anti-Semitic actions The last argument seems to be among the most radical.

Jedwabne und die Folgen, Berlin — Wien One important effect of this omission is to preserve nationalism for the liberal opposition, to construct nationalism as anti-communism in reference to the strikes, by eliminating the memory of Communist-backed nationalist invectives against Jews. A good analysis comes from The article described the setting of recollections of in the context of the politics of Poland and the Czech Republic.

In the case of Poland, the commentary pointed to the emphasis placed by Adam Michnik on the role of the then events as a catalyst of the birth of the opposition and to the negation of this on the right of the Polish political scene. In an article written for Die Welt, Adam Michnik took a different position.

At the same time, he defended the nationalism is alive and well, especially in the political activities of the Catholic church. See Appendix 3. Sauerland wrote that the president had belonged to the political formation which had unleashed the anti-Semitic hue-and-cry in In the subsequent years, the both domestic politics and the intervention in Czechoslovakia was recalled in order to emphasise the undemocratic nature of the system of power in the Eastern bloc and in Poland.

References to the tradition of the democratic protests of made in Poland during the Solidarity years were noticeable. Following the introduction of martial law, it was recalled that some members of the military authorities had been involved in the quelling of social protests including the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The assessment of Jaruzelski was not unambiguous. On the other hand, an observation recurrently emerged to the effect that, in , the Polish army on its own did what had required outside intervention in Czechoslovakia in A comment of this nature, be it longer or briefer, was deemed a necessary accompaniament to every item published in the press about him Net, No.

In the report of his death, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. However, Karol Sauerland, the author of the article, then added that in the stormy period of , he was away from Poland and no one can know how he would have behaved upon seeing the brutal actions against the Jews, students and intellectuals Let us thus conclude with the appeal, voiced by Karol Sauerland, for the restoration of the Jews to Polish memory, which refers to an important issue also articulated in the West German press as a reproach to the Poles, a reproach in respect of the fact that, despite the enormous change which Poland has undergone, this restoration is yet to occur.

This was bluntly expressed by Sauerland, [ Die Polizei griff nicht ein. Die Regierung beschuldigte lokale Chauvinisten der Tat. Er greift nach der Macht. Kollege Novotny in Prag wich dem neuen tschechoslowakischen Liberal- -Kommunismus. Ochab wich dem — stalinistischen — Nationalkommunisten Moczar. Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Radek standen in ihren Reihen. Nationalkommunist Moczar hatte sich stets im Hintergrund gehalten.

Vorsitzender der Vereinigung ehemaliger Partisanen: General Moczar. Mehrere Theater- und Filmfachleute wurden entlassen, der weltbekannte Regisseur Alexander Ford angegriffen. Eine erste Gruppe hatte das Land schon bei Kriegsende oder kurz danach verlassen. Eine solche Reaktion hat Tradition. Bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit ist in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik das Jahr eine politische Wasserscheide. Um ihre Macht zu sichern und zumindest die Basis der Partei auf regierungstreuen Kurs zu bringen, brachte der innerste Zirkel um Gomulka eine antisemitische Kampagne ins Rollen.

Nach der Wende begann Polen, die schwarzen Flecken der eigenen Geschichte anzupacken. Einer dieser Flecken ist der Antisemitismus. Nationalistische Kreise und nationalkonservative Vertreter der Kirche leugnen jegliche katalysatorische Wirkung des Jahres Sie halten den damaligen Dissidenten vor, selbst aus der kommunistischen Partei zu kommen und deshalb kompromittiert zu sein.

Die Entmythisierung hat begonnen. Auf Anordnung Moskaus wurde die Tschechoslowakei auf Linie gebracht. Diese theoretischen Fragen dringen aber kaum in breite Teile der Gesellschaft vor. Eine tiefgreifende Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit fehlt. Als am Ich traute meinen Augen nicht. All diese jungen Menschen wurden zugleich als ehemalige Stalinisten beziehungsweise als Kinder von solchen bezeichnet.

Andere hatte ich bei ihren Auftritten erlebt. Der Danziger Bahnhof in Warschau war der Ort, von dem aus sie sich nach Wien begaben, um von dort aus nach Israel, in die Vereinigten Staaten oder auch in die Bundesrepublik weiterzureisen. Ich war mehrmals auf diesem Bahnhof, um Bekannte zu verabschieden. Beide hatten kurz nach dem 8. Unvergesslich bleibt mir der Besuch bei Kolakowski. Es muss im Oktober gewesen sein. Ich fragte ihn, was er jetzt mache. Er antwortete, er lese Paracelsus, um der Sprache Heideggers auf die Spur zu kommen.

Es war keine theatralische Geste, sondern entsprach seinem damaligen Charakter. Warschau, ja das ganze Land trocknete geistig aus. Die Freiheitsbewegung wurde auf diese Weise brutal niedergeschlagen. Heute sind diese Leute zumeist pensioniert oder bereits verstorben, jedoch ihr Geist lebt in vielem und bei vielen weiter. Nie gab es den Versuch eines Dialoges. Rufe nach Versammlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit folgten. In dieser Hinsicht waren sie Realisten. Es war das einzig passende Ende des Weges, der am Denkmal von Mickiewicz begann.

Joanna Szymoniczek Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events of the year therein Introduction The aim of this study is to present reactions of the Polish society and the Polish public, of the events of in Germany. To reach the aim, press articles have been analysed from a number of angles, including the frequency of their appearance, the way of depicting the events, the opinions and commentaries, the headlining of reports and the placement of photos, as well as the relationship of the articles in question with those tackling other topics which were printed in the most popular publications of the time.

Furthermore, it seeks an answer to whether the articulation of the views of Polish public opinion was possible in ; how was the image of the events of in Germany manipulated in the press; how Polish society reacted to those events; whether the events had their continuation in the Polish media and whether they were invoked in subsequent years and, if so, then how and upon what occasion. From the outset, the ruling communist party treated the radio and the press, and later, television as well, as one of the most crucial instruments for the exertion of power and the control of social processes1.

Polish public opinion towards Germany and the events The substance of everything to be communicated was subjected to incisive censorship. Only content prepared in this way was recognised as valid and authentic2. By the same token, there existed far-reaching possibilities of creating a picture of the world for the recipients which either differed fairly radically, or even diverged from reality completely. Given the subject under discussion, several measures undertaken in respect of the press in Poland should be addressed. This included a prohibition on the monitoring of foreign radio stations by editorial staff.

Polish Press Agency itself was limited as far as potential undertakings were concerned. Truth was relativised. It was common to operate half-truths or write untrue things, as it was acknowledged as desirable, just as long as it served the purpose. The world was depicted in black and white, tapping into an internally coherent system of stereotypes and selectively gathering facts and arguments in tune with a thesis established in advance. By using stereotypes, the press consolidated and preserved a range of myths. The absence of any polemic whatsoever was perceptible in the writing, as was its one-sidedness.

Zarys problematyki [Media in Poland. The Outline of Problems], Warszawa , p. The content was rendered more attractive and efforts were made to differentiate and enrich both form and language in order to bring the publications closer to the people and their concerns. It thus constitutes a fundamental structure within a non-democratic state, since it permits the legitimisation of those who hold power. If all that is available to society is one, manipulated image, then that is the basis upon which opinions and judgements will be formed.

Initially, the function of censorship was controlled by the Minister of the Interior. It reported to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. It guaranteed civil freedoms. The decree itself was revoked on 1st July and preventative censorship was abolished in Against this background, the heroism of the Soviet Union and its role in defeating fascism was continuously emphasised.

The articles made frequent reference to the revisionist politics of the post-war FRG. Hence, West Germany was presented as a militaristic state desirous of atomic weapons and rockets, bringing pressure to bear on the Western partners in the case of armament and obstructing disarmament Polish diplomats, though, suspected that individual countries would not be observing them. Moreover, the Romanian leader had opposed attempts to intensify integration under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and criticised the proposal for establishing, under its auspices, a multilateral cooperation in which not all the member states would participate He himself did not block the possibility of Polish-West German talks, proposing contact with the FRG at ministerial level.

Notwithstanding pressure from Warsaw and Berlin, on 31st January , Romania established diplomatic relations with Bonn. His position was strong enough for this condition to be accepted Yet, in November , the authorities of the GDR withdrew from decisions which had already been taken concerning the enhancement of coordination of the economies of the two states.

Meanwhile, West German diplomacy was beginning to emerge from its earlier impasse. In , diplomatic relations between the FRG and Romania were established, and a year later they were re-established with Yugoslavia.

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In terms of propagandist objectives, things were no different in , with negative information regarding the FRG readily being published, though it should be noted that it were the events in the United States of America and France which were predominant in the Polish media that year. In , the Vietnam War, in particular, was emphasised to this end, especially when the Americans committed crimes, were defeated in battle or suffered grave losses of personnel.

The intention was to discredit, in much the same way as were accounts relating to the training of special units and suppression of liberation movements in Latin America. The press reports also focused on American support for Israel The domestic policy of the US was subjected to critical judgement as well. Commentary on the events in France, particularly as compared to the manner of reporting the situation in the United States, was scanter, more laconic and considerably more balanced Nevertheless, this does not mean that West Germany was not addressed at all during the course of that year.

The perception was that the sixties had brought to the Western world a new social and moral manifestation, the foundations of which were cultural transformations and the frustrations of the students and graduates in search of jobs, as well as a naive anarchism, this last being a reaction to prosperity, order and the absence of more serious problems. These manifestations and the transformation in morality were negatively appraised in the Polish media The pressing matter was purely one of creating a picture of a repressive system, quelling any and every opposition by violent means.

It was only due to the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke that separate copies were devoted to Germany. Never again! Brief mention was also made of Benno Ohnesorg, a student who was shot by a policeman, Karl Heinz Kurras, on 2nd June , during a demonstration against the state visit of the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

It should be emphasised that in the nineteen daily paper titles analysed only one photo of the Socialist German Student Union leader was found. Meanwhile, the disturbances persisted throughout Germany. At the time, though, the attention of the Polish media was once again riveted on events in the United States and France.

In , the FRG turned up in the Polish press in one other context, that is, in connection with the gathering menace in Czechoslovakia. As it could be expected, close attention was paid in Poland to the events taking place in its southern neighbour. The diverse outlooks were emphasised, but so was the ability to reach a harmonious standpoint. These items of news were reported without adhering to an alarmist tone. It was pointed out that the imperative of curtailing and combating antisocialist forces had been underrated in Czechoslovakia.

The KSC had not acted as the instigator of transformation, but had permitted discussion on the establishment of opposition parties. The anti-party forces had not been given enough serious consideration because the KSC was too strongly rooted in the traditions of acting within the existing law, as had been the case in the interwar years. It was not inured against sabotage and provocation. In July the news of the abolition of censorship came. The reports, which were later denied, concerned the removal of the security barrier on the Czech side of the border with the FRG.

Even so, the number of caricatures and cartoons connected with the Germans which appeared in the columns of the Polish press in was impressive. The best evidence of this is the fact that, in that year, the satirical weekly, Szpilki, devoted as many as four of its front covers to the subject of Germany. It was far more rare for references to be made to other associations linked with that nationality and these, too, were very simple i.

This was particularly so in the s, when caricatures of the Germans were most frequently published and were highly aggressive. In subsequent years, they appeared somewhat more rarely, though they were still fairly plentiful. The caricatures gradually became milder and milder; nonetheless, the usual associations continued to relate to the Nazi era. It was no different in Photographs of the aforementioned Szpilki covers focusing upon Germany have been included in this volume.

References in the Polish press to the events of in Germany As elucidated in the foregoing section, the events of in Germany were not to enjoy much interest on the part of the Polish media. It was no different in the years that followed. Even then, though, if they are referred to at all, it is to a minor extent and in passing, with seldom more substantial analysis nor conclusions. Hence the ready reporting of anything at all which might damage the image of the Western states in the eyes of Polish society; economic problems, aggressive foreign policies, social unrest, assassinations, murders, disasters and so forth.

Whenever circumstances allowed, the problems of other Western states were also eagerly summoned into play. All of these added to the moral collapse of the Western world Youth subcultures such as the mods, the hippies, the serious heavy-metal fans, the punks and the skinheads received a very poor press The source of all these negative manifestations was perceived in a multitude of factors, including, of course, the events of in the West and their consequences, since those events were held to have brought about profound and negatively evaluated transformations to the consciousness of Western societies, with the students becoming the social and political or academic elite in their countries, something of which no good could come.

What draws the attention in this presentation of the problem is a certain inconsistency in the assessment of both the events of and their outcome. However, at the same time, they were censured for their behaviour. The RAF was supported by Palestinian terrorists, who hijacked a German passenger plane which was then recaptured by an anti-terrorist unit. A left-wing terrorist organisation with ideological links to Maoism, Marxism, anarchism and the New Left, the RAF had launched its activities prior to However, until that year, by and large, news of the organisation and its operations had not appeared in the Polish press.

Single reports were published following the Heidelberg incident in May , when the faction bombed the headquarters of the U. Army in Europe, with the loss of three American soldiers. The situation changed in the autumn of that year. On 5th September, members of the RAF kidnapped Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and, having held him captive for forty-one days, proceeded to murder him. From the outset, the topic was fairly widely reported in Poland; in fact, news appeared on a daily basis with regard to the abducted man, the actions taken by the German authorities in attempting to secure his release, the demands of the kidnappers, the reactions of individual German politicians to acts of terror and so forth On the one hand, the focus was turned toward the crisis being faced by that state during the German Autumn, since this concurred with the guidelines laid down for the media, while, on the other hand, there was a growing interest in terrorism itself and the underlying causes thereof, with endeavours being made to analyse what had occurred in Germany and, indeed, why it had happened in that particular country It was pointed out that the group had sprung from the waves of youth and student unrest which had occurred in Emphasis was placed on matters which showed the politics of Germany and the Western European states in a poor light and assailed capitalism and the Western lifestyle The roots of terrorism were perceived in the student movement of and those of the movement itself in the youth subcultures, where different roads were sought and established behaviours, traditions, institutions and authorities were opposed.

Given his background, this fact became a pretext for recalling the events of in Germany. In a book entitled So macht Kommunismus Spass! Serious elaborations upon the subject were also lacking in this instance. In subsequent years, there were few references in the Polish press to what went on in Germany in , since wheresoever it proved possible, journalists took the subject of the Second World War as their reference point.

Admittedly, both stories made the front pages of the majority of the papers on 19th November; nonetheless, it was the news of the latter, another success for Soviet science in its conquering of the universe, which took pride of place, with congratulations in the name of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, the State Council, the government and the Polish nation appended Besides reports of the ceremonies held in Poland, recollections and references to the war itself appeared, as did the tragic stories of witnesses, reminders of the scale of the crimes and, on occasion, photos dating from those times.

These topics were usually linked with German expectations of apologies for the expulsions, statements in respect of the contested borders along the Oder and Neisse rivers and so on News relating to the neo-fascist party and to commemorative ceremonies held in Germany in relation to the Second World War or to a politician of that era was imparted vividly and highly emotionally. Warnings were sounded against German revanchism and relationism.

The revival of the German army also gave cause for great concern Throughout these years, a relatively large number of column inches was given over to the German political scene, with elections being of particular interest, be they presidential, parliamentary, or to the Landtags State Diets. An event which drew the particular attention of the Polish media was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Numerous titles published extensive reports full of the views of joyful Berliners which were accompanied by photographs However, it should be noted that they made their appearance somewhat tardily in relation to the occurrence of the events themselves Across the entire period under analysis in this study, the Polish media were more than happy to impart news of problems and predicaments.

Before , this willingness to present the FRG unfavourably is highly visible; later it becomes less direct, though it can still be perceived in some of the titles. There was frequently a dearth of serious analysis, as well as honest opinions and commentaries.

The situation was not to change until after A German of this nature comprised a threat to the Poles and Poland, particularly in the context of the border to the west. This tone abated slightly during the seventies, but it proved impossible to slough off misgivings about the Germans. Hence the picture of Germany painted by the Polish press in was focussed primarily on the introduction of the Emergency Acts, the suppression of protests and police brutality, as well as on criticism of the situation that had come to pass there.

Apart from the attempted assassination of Rudi Dutschke, no further attention was paid to the events themselves; the student protests in Germany were recorded as part and parcel of similar occurrences in other Western states at the time. Things remained much the same in subsequent years. References to were few and far between, being superseded by those relating to the Second World War. The year itself was predominantly treated as the cause and explanation for everything that had gone wrong in the moral and social spheres, which is to say, such manifestations as youth subcultures, feminism, the decline of the traditional family, sexual freedom, drug addition, the decline in education, terrorism and so forth, all of which were adjudged negatively.

Allen Debra J. Zur Relevanz eines wissenschaftlischen Grundbegriffs, Generationen. Cohen Warren I. Crampton Richard J. Dynamische Zeiten. Die Eliten-Perspektive, Opladen Eisler Jerzy, Marzec Falk Barbara J. Fik Marta, Marcowa kultura. The March Campaign], Warszawa Frei Norbert, Garthoff Raymond L. Gluza Renata ed. The Plans and the Reality, —], Warszawa Klatch Rebecca A.

Eine politische Biographie, Frankfurt am Main Lepsius Rainer M. Long Kristi S. Mason David S. Ouimet Matthew J. Polska wobec zjednoczenia Niemiec — Ramet Sabrina P. Title of English edition: Making Communism Fun. Sauerland Karol, Polen und Juden zwischen und Jedwabne und die Folgen, Berlin—Wien The Outline of Problems], Warszawa Tebinka Jacek, Nadzieje i rozczarowania. Tilly Charles, European Revolutions, —, Oxford Europa nad dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Frankfurt am Main Rother H. Zimmerman Paul D.

Index:German/s

The Fight for the Shape of Scouting] A. Baran ed. Studia historyczne [From Coercion to Freedom. Historical Studies] J. Bayer, W. Dziak: Mao Zedong. Victories, Hopes, Defeats] P. Bogactwo czy problem? Luck or Curse? Burakowski: Geniusz Karpat. Burakowski, M. Romania after ] A.

Szansa czy wy- zwanie dla systemu euroatlantyckiego [Multipolar Europe in the Multipolar World. Dziak: Kim Dzong Un. Dziak, G. Strnad: Republika Korei. Zarys ewolucji systemu politycznego [South Korea. Dziak, K. Gawlikowski, M. Pespektywy rozwoju [China in 21st Century. Fiszer ed. Origin, Experiences, Perspecti- ves] J. Fiszer, J. Holzer eds. Wasilewski eds. Antinomies of 17th-century English Political Thought] R.

Grathoff, A. Holzer, J. Fiszer eds. Jarosz: Suicide M. Jarosz ed. A Society in Time of Crisis] M. Jarosz, P. The Bilateral and International Dimensions] W. Plans and Reality, —] W. Kaczmarek, P. Karp, R. Traba eds. Warmia i Mazury we wspomnieniach [Everyday Life Remembered. Warmia-Masuria Memoirs] L. Markowski eds. Polityka ekipy gen. Kula ed. Kurczewska, E. Tarkowska eds. Polityka wzrostu w krajach peryferyjnych — [A Leap into the Modernity. Growth Politics in Periphery Coun- tries, —] D. Mach: Pokolenie historycznej nadziei i codziennego ryzyka. Mach ed.

Madajczyk: Czystki etniczne i klasowe w Europie XX wieku. Essays] P. Madajczyk, D. The History and Rememberance] P. Madajczyk, P. Fighting against Radio Free Europe] W. Marciniak ed. Markowski ed. July — March ] W.

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This time, however, it took on a new quality, bearing in mind that other countries of the bloc also took part in the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was to be a sui generis warning on the part of Moscow and to spare it the need to resort to such drastic measures in order to maintain its empire and its dependencies in the future.

Some countries returned to contacts on the ministerial level quite soon. He was working to persuade Warsaw to consider undertaking talks with the FRG. He also gave his assurance that, in their talks with the FRG, the French politicians were maintaining that the border had to be recognised. His question resulted from apprehensions not only shared in France.

Winiewicz, 30 October Was that a new phase of the Soviet-German dialogue? The Rapallo syndrome was also present in the Polish thinking. Perhaps no decision had been yet made as to who was to succeed him. In autumn , the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs returned to the implementation of its suspended projects. The hope was that the developing international dialogue would make their presentation 27 Ibidem. From the late and early , an increase in the number of bilateral contacts could be seen.

This is not an easy question. This guaranteed the continuity of not only studies and conceptual work, but also of some aspects of the diplomatic tactics. Grasping the nettle. In a memo from the Bureau of Studies of the Polish MFA explaining why it was necessary to undertake diplomatic action, it was pointed out, inter alia, that the Western countries, particularly the FRG, may seize the initiative in respect of the European conference. Ludwiczak, A. The Plans and the Reality, —], Warszawa , p. Bilateral and International Perspective], Warszawa , p.

The authors also pointed to the growing interest in European issues in the United States and, in particular, to a document entitled Toward the reconciliation of Europe: New approaches for the U. Johnson, an expert on international relations advising President Richard Nixon. It included an idea which envisaged the conference of the Great Powers setting up a commission consisting of ten states, with both German states numbering among them, the aim of which would be to carry out a debate on the issues related to European security. Warsaw had no expectations of anything which it might view as a positive turn in the US policy from the swearing-in of President Nixon in January In , Nixon travelled to Europe34, where he spoke of plans to hold talks with the USSR and announced consultations with the allies on bilateral talks with that country.

For the policy of the new administration, vide, i. Pismo przewodnie S. Points for talks on European security. Covering letter by S. It was understood that it could no longer be the same policy as before. Doubts also emerged in some political circles as to whether it would be possible for the Ostpolitik to be continued at all, because the USSR was considered to have become hostile to it The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Brandt in also certainly contributed to this In a memo to Brandt of 11 September, Egon Bahr pointed to the psychological consequences of the Czechoslovakian events, namely, an increased sense of living under a threat in the West and in West Germany and the emergence of opinions that, under the rights of the Four Powers, the USSR might also intervene, for instance, in the case of West Berlin He thus formed new priorities.

Berlin might thus become a tool, both in the case of Moscow and in that of Paris, London and Washington and it could not be ruled out that a decision taken by the Great Powers would prove not to be identical with the German interest. Bahr thought that the situation remaining as a result of the war, whereby the FRG was not vested with full rights in international relations, had to be ended. This was the objective that the Ostpolitik was to serve and this was why it should be continued.

He was of the opinion that it was the sense of threat to its own interests, the result of the diplomatic offensive on the part of the FRG, which had prompted Moscow to undertake efforts aimed at strengthening the cohesiveness of the bloc. According to Bahr, the remaining option was to give priority to relations with the USSR, which hinted at the necessity of undertaking talks on the re-establishment of bilateral relations.

On the other hand, he did not consider it right to forgo entirely either the policy of submitting proposals Politik des Angebots suited to their interests to particular countries of the bloc, or, by the same token, tailoring the Ostpolitik on a country-by-country basis, and individualising it.

He thus thought that, while a change in the status quo in Europe, in other words, the overcoming of the partition of Germany, remained the main objective of German policy, the achievement of the latter might be served by some form of acceptance of the former, assuming that it would be no more than a temporary acceptance. In view of the complications in the West, it could thus neither be settled with Moscow alone nor forfeited in its role as a potentially useful bargaining chip in the future.

There was a growing recognition of the fact that the possibilities of particular countries of the bloc conducting a more independent policy had become restricted; following the invasion, their societies were permeated by a mood of disenchantment and their authorities disinclined to oppose the Kremlin. In such a situation, talks with the USSR seemed to be a natural route leading to wider contacts with the bloc. Ruete, 7 October Opinions were also voiced to the effect that a dialogue with the Kremlin may lead to the squandering of the positive capital accumulated as an outcome of the new Ostpolitik.

It was thus concluded that the FRG should strive for the continuation of the talks with the satellite countries. Taking a position on the conditions for the normalisation of the relations with the FRG agreed by the Eastern bloc in Warsaw in February , an assessment was set out in a memo, postulating that, from the 53 His approach to the USSR was demonstrated, inter alia, by his attitude in At the same time, it noted that the issue of recognising the Munich Treaty as null and void ex tunc had lost its psychological saliency These assessments were not quite accurate; at any rate, the meaning of these issues in the policy of both states, of both Poland and Czechoslovakia, was not limited solely to psychological and propagandistic.

If, on the other hand, thought was being given to their governments making themselves independent of Moscow, then, indeed, it had no major meaning. Suggestions were also being made with a view to making use of cultural and political opportunities. On the other hand, warnings were being voiced to the effect that undertaking talks with Beijing might do to the Ostpolitik more harm than good at that stage.

During talks between the political director of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jacques de Beaumarchais, and his West German counterpart, Paul Frank, the latter was interested in the talks between France and Poland, as well as Moscow, regarding the border and voiced the opinion that its recognition would deprive the USSR of one of its strongest cards with regard to the countries of the bloc, suggesting this might be badly received in Moscow The French diplomat, on the other hand, pondered whether events in Czechoslovakia, would not have taken a different turn had the FRG recognised the border in early He also added that the USSR wanted the status quo to be recognised.

The German participants asked their French interlocutors, as was noted in the memo, not to record this part of the conversation in their minutes. As it was pointed out earlier, the temporary check in the contacts between the Western states and the USSR and its satellites did not last long. Despite the quite pessimistic overtone of the ministerial studies drawn up for in-house consumption, Bonn began to probe the possibility of renewing contact with the bloc. He also claimed that the renunciation of force was, in fact, tantamount to preserving the status quo Germany continued to attempt to undertake talks with Poland.

Kruczkowski, 20 October Wojna pondered the fact that almost all of them were concerned by the developments in the international situation and the possible outbreak of a war He also voiced the opinion that it should include not only political advisors, but also those concerned with economic, military and psychological operations Developments in Czechoslovakia were deemed therein to be a tool which was to serve the FRG in making its Ostpolitik more active.

Wolniak, 10 September Erhard Eppler in conversation with the author, October , Prague. Willmann, 6 November These disturbances were derived from both the general atmosphere in the country, resulting from waiting for the situation to stabilise, and from the personnel changes. The need to change the foreign policy was, however, perceived elsewhere. Various ways of making the policy towards Germany more active were discussed, including propaganda.

It seems that the turning of attention to these groups also resulted from watching the events of in the FRG. Nowakowski, 8 November Kuczkowski, 18 November After , attempts to undertake a dialogue with Poland were being made by, inter alia, politicians from the FPD. The FRG authorities attempted to encourage Warsaw to undertake contacts. Winiewicz, 11 March Eine politische Biographie, Frankfurt am Main , p. Also: W. Winiewicz saw a valid point in undertaking contacts, but primarily with feature writers and non-governmental interlocutors, in order to present the Polish standpoint.

Winiewicz, 19 January Winiewicz, 15 April Bonn thus continued to look for opportunities to solve the issues in which it was interested by means of bilateral talks as well. As far as Polish-German relations were concerned, following the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, a period of arranging the bilateral relations began, a process of solving the existing legacy which is generally referred to as normalisation. Normalisation included dealing with a series of issues, some of which continued to remain a matter of controversy and were the subject of political talks which lasted until and beyond.

There was also the matter of economic cooperation, linked not only by Poland, but also by the FRG, to other questions. Yet another question was that of the operation of Radio Free Europe. From Hostility to an Agreement —], Warszawa See, i. As a matter of fact, this was a phenomenon typical of that period, not only at the level of government institutions, but also at that of academic institutions.

Studies on the generation became popular only at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Nevertheless, this does mean that in Poland no attention was paid at the time i. Diplomatic reports and memos provide evidence that the activities of the extra-parliamentary opposition, both in West Berlin and in the FRG, were closely observed. It was in the seventies that the presence of the ideas of and of the generation began to be marked in the Western media.

Some people associated this either with the fact that certain activists had their roots in the GDR or with funding from East Berlin Richter eds. In time, given that the events of and the changes they triggered were of a global nature and that, after the passing of successive years, it was the generation which, as a result of the demographic processes, began entering the political arena, so other values, another approach to the world and a somewhat different understanding of priorities in international politics also started to appear to a wider extent, albeit that, in this case, it was not infrequent that the Realpolitik took the upper hand.

The year , which in common perception is often associated with the events in Western Europe, in particular, France, the FRG and the USA, had a much wider dimension. One of the consequences of was a wider consideration being given in public discourse to the human rights. Admittedly, the focus was on their individual rather than their political or social rights, but they cannot be separated entirely.

The growing interest in human rights, particularly after , resulted not only from the entry into the political and social arena of a generation which paid more attention to them, but also from the fact that the politicians perceived them a useful instrument 77 See i. Truly, in the seventies, this was not the case with German politicians, albeit that the generation was slowly beginning to enter the media and politics. The issue of the observance of human rights also performed an increasing role in the case of the bilateral talks with the FRG, which might be perceived both as an effect of an even more daring resorting to this argument in their policy toward various countries of what the Western states dubbed the socialist bloc, but it might also have been an effect of , albeit that it is the political reasons, including those related to the domestic politics of the FRG, which may be deemed to have dominated the discourse.

Apart from the then current issues in the bilateral relations, it was the legacy of the Polish-German relationship which continued to weight heavily. It seems that, while it was the 79 See i. Ferraris, Rudolf Perina, Skjold G. In fact, as of the early seventies, it was pointed out in documents that it was to this very young generation that propaganda efforts should be addressed to It 80 On the role of the past, see i.

The World Eine Werte- und Interessengemeinschaft? One of the questions having a bearing on the bilateral relationships was that of compensations for the Polish slave workers. The FRG had consistently refused any talks regarding individual compensations, apart from certain exceptions such as those for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments Nevertheless, in , it was the opposition in the FRG, which, in a manner not unrelated to the approaching anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, began attracting attention to the necessity of settling the issue of compensations for the Polish people.

Nevertheless, these proposals did not cover the slave workers. It was suggested that a separate fund should be established to provide for their claims It was perfectly understood that extending the compensation act to cover all the victims of the III Reich in Eastern Europe, in particular the slave workers, would result in enormous budgetary expenditures.

In the case of the FRG, research into the generation made it possible to point out somewhat more precisely to whom and to which groups this term may apply. The group of direct participants in the events, linked to the student, youth and subculture movements and the extra-parliamentary opposition was quite substantial. The majority of studies thus focussed on these aspects, while events also included student protests which were not motivated by strictly political objectives On the subject literature: J. The impact of the events in their home country was different and linked more to political issues.

In the post-transformation period, the people involved in the events of joined the power elites and the opinion-forming milieus. Nevertheless, if they refer to in their reminiscences, then they either dwell on those aspects which were related to the experiences resulting from belonging to the bloc, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or on those which were typically Polish, like March The people who took part in the survey also pointed out that their knowledge of the events which occurred in in the FRG was scant In the German edition of the research on the elites of both countries, which was a more extensive publication than the Polish one, a series of categories emerged; however, this could also be considered to demonstrate the fallout of the consequences of in a wide sense, which is to say, the issues of ecology, secularity, the attitude toward the church and denominational groups, and tolerance, albeit that it was the problems related to the determinants of the political relationships and, in particular, of foreign policy, which dominated the research and thus the publication In the case of the bilateral political relationships, the role of elites is stronger than in a case where those relationships are understood in a wider sense, which is to say, encompassing contacts at the social level, among them those resulting from business operations, tourism, and so forth, where it is individuals who play a greater role, including those individuals who can hardly be deemed to belong to the elites.

A survey conducted a few years later indicated that differences existed in the approach to many issues, primarily political, which also had an impact on the bilateral relations A Community of Interests and Values? It was thanks to the media that news had an easier reach. At that time, the role of the mass media, including the new forms, continued to grow, which also held true for the post-transformation period.

The active participants in those events particularly adhered to the slogans of the left wing The effects of the global character of the events of may also be observed in the case of Poland. In the existing literature on the subject, differences in approach to many political, social and other such issues in the bilateral relations have not been linked to the effects of the events of Nevertheless, it could be argued that, in the case of the Polish and the German societies, the different approach to various issues is also the long-term result of other effects of , which, for reasons of both a domestic and an external nature, have taken a different course in the two countries.

Noie Zeit - German Oi! Attack (Hörprobe)

This may apply, in particular, to certain questions, such as, for example, ecological matters, which enjoy a better understanding in Western societies, including Germany. In the present circumstances, they also translate into politics, in the context of the EU. Warsaw was also criticised in connection with the refusal to sign the Charter of Fundamental Rights, elaborated in European Union, which included adverse commentary on the part of one of the leaders of , Daniel Cohn-Bendit.

In the longer perspective, the effects of consisted, inter alia, of changes in the value systems, primarily in Western Europe, but also in Poland, albeit that they occurred at a different pace and, as a result of both international and domestic determinants, including different social traditions, they were not identical in nature.

Nevertheless, in the case of both Western and Eastern Europe, became a catalyst for the modus operandi of societies. They might have possibly determined the attitude towards the social and political issues debated at the supranational level, for example, within the structures of the European Union as well, albeit that it needs to be kept in mind that they were not the sole factor. Piotr Madajczyk The impact of the events of the year on the forming of the image of Poland and the Poles in public opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany Introduction The events of the year already have a very extensive literature.

The extent to which it may provide the basis for an analysis of the topic of interest to us is, however, scant.


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Studies carried out in Poland focus primarily on the events of March Although other numerous works have been published in the meantime, this study remains the best analysis of them all. Its fundamental departure point is provided by an analysis of the crisis of an authoritarian social and 1 Jerzy Eisler, Marzec Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje [March On the other hand, a translation of a very interesting study by Paul Berman has been published in Poland.

Not those who became lost to destruction in the radicalism of their slogans, though, but those who followed a road leading them to accept democracy and reject all forms of totalitarianism3. The impact of the events of the year on the forming of the image The common ground for the protest was provided by belonging to the same generation. The circumstances in Poland were too disparate, which made the Polish youth more resistant to a naive belief in the renewing powers of Chinese, Cuban or Vietnamese communism. The fact, as pointed out by Norbert Frei, that the scale to which the Polish students changed their lifestyle was minor is not relevant here.

What is relevant is that they desired these changes just as the youth in the Western countries did and that they believed they were possible. In the Western countries, it primarily meant a rebellion against the older generation as the one imposing traditional and outdated norms and values. It was, however, not directed against them and it considered itself to be a continuator of the Polish national tradition. In the communist countries, the protest was focused on the issue of freedom, this being particularly marked in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Social and economic problems dominated in the Third World countries, while 4 Cf.

The social, economic, demographic and ideological context of the protests erupting at various points was thus different. The latter overlapped with the debates on the history of the Jews in Poland and the accusation of being co-responsible for the Holocaust levelled at the Poles.

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World public opinion 5 Cf. It was this thread which took the upper hand, which implied a focus on the Soviet army, albeit that it was emphasised that the intervention was a joint undertaking on the part of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty. In the West German press of the time information about Poland was practically non-existent. The villains of the piece were always the same, in other words, Brezhnev, accompanied by the leaders of the communist parties in Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic GDR , Poland and Hungary, depicted cynically announcing the suppression of the Prague Spring as a success in the struggle for peace.

Author: Wolfgang Hicks. Author: Wilhelm Hartung.

Dijk, Lutz Van

It is for these reasons that the participation of the Polish army in the intervention did not result in a more negative attitude towards Poland in the Federal Republic of Germany FRG. Was the anti-Semite campaign described as a tool manipulated by the Polish authorities, one which they used to destroy the movement for democracy? Or as a campaign drawing on the strong anti-Semitic anti-democratic feelings existing in the Polish society? Queries articulated in such a manner recall to mind the fact that the debate on was, and is, also a part of the controversy regarding the problem of anti-Semitism in the post Poland.

Nacken wrote in a tone similar to that taken in the commentaries published in Die Welt and written by Richard Davy, who was expelled by the Polish authorities from the country. He described the atmosphere of crisis which the authorities were attempting to get under control by using the police and informers and by intimidating the society.

They presented an image of a country immersed in a crisis, where any opportunity for more active undertakings was, to all intents and purposes, blocked. Introducing reforms with a forward thrust was impossible; the only actions being taken were in response to the immediate challenges, which resulted in the same problems recurring with multiplied force after a certain time.

The entire apparatus of power was represented as operating ineffectively and the people in responsible positions as afraid to make decisions. Any amendment to the foreign policy was also blocked. In the mean time, the example of Czechoslovakia was reported as presenting an additional challenge and a threat to the communist authorities in Warsaw. Sympathy for the student protests in Poland dominated in the West German press. The article pointed out that, in the Eastern bloc, a protester risked repression and brutal action on the part of the police. In the FRG, including West Berlin, a protester risked nothing as long as the legal norms were not breached.

The message carried at that time by the press was dominated by pointing to the domestic determinants of the protests in Poland. He concluded that, despite extrinsic similarities, the two revolts were more disparate than they had in common. They also led in a different direction, bearing in mind that many Western students drifted into anti-democratic, left-wing radicalism, while many of their Eastern counterparts evolved towards democracy and a civic society.

See Appendix 5. This style did not change over the following days but the reports became more detailed. After a week, news from Poland became scarce, but could still be found in almost any March issue of Frankfurter Allgemeine. News from Czechoslovakia continued to dominate as the situation in and around that country became even more tense. There are no grounds for making a fundamental distinction between the information published by the West German press and that arriving by diplomatic channels.

One may recall the assessment, made by a West German diplomat in Paris and shared by the West German Foreign Ministry, to the effect that information arriving at the French Foreign Ministry from the bloc states was very extensive but, in terms of substance, it contributed no more, in any aspect, than the information published in the press This was in mid-March.

It was known that, unlike Czechoslovakia, the student protests in Poland had its sources outside the party, while the students had not played a decisive role in the outbreak of the Prague Spring. In Poland, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority of the society rejected the system, the student protest failed to obtain support to any larger extent. Klaiber, No. The beginning of his telex message resembled part of the FAZ article: Thousands of manifestations keep the party and the population on the move.

The propaganda trumpets that Poland is in danger. The movement has gained in both force and the extent of its impact out of all proportion to the cause. The propaganda, which raises memories of the years of Hitler, is an excuse for numerous dismissals in science, culture and administration, primarily of Poles of Jewish origin Propaganda trommelt, dass Polen in Gefahr sei.

Weltjudentum bedrohe Existenz des Staates. Bewegung hat Gewicht und Breite angenommen, die in keinem Verhaeltnis mehr zu Anlass stehen. He also raised doubts on the part of the West German counter-intelligence True, nothing was proven against him, but the ambiguous atmosphere might have resulted in his dispatches being regarded with some distance by the Foreign Ministry. A total involvement, a total profession of belonging to the nation and a total acceptance of communism on the Polish road to socialism is being called for Another article was published on 15th April by Der Spiegel.

Anti-Semitism in the Polish society was not mentioned at all He described the social feelings in Poland in terms similar to those used by the FAZ correspondent, Angela Nacken, who had written of the limited support for the protest. He then listed the demands for changes, for democratisation, for freedom of conscience and denomination, in culture and science, for the abolishment of censorship and for independence from the Soviet Union.

See Appendix 1. It does not speak on behalf of the masses. In his opinion, it was unable to exploit the potential of the discontent in society. He was also convinced that a similar role fell to Adam Kruczkowski as a new deputy minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The atmosphere of ambiguity continued. Es ist in Bewegung geraten. Die Intelligenz in Polen lebt in einer eigenen Welt. Sie ist fast die Slachta der Neuzeit. In accordance with the advice of its representative in Warsaw, it should consist, as had already happened quite often, of waiting, refraining from comments on the domestic events in Poland, watching the situation carefully and re-commencing talks, primarily with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when the time was right, but not attempting them right then because that might end in a compromising situation for the FRG.

After the assassination attempt on the life of Rudi Dutschke, on 11th April, the media were dominated by the concerns of domestic politics. Attention was raised by the situation in Yugoslavia and Romania, two countries which demonstrated independence from Moscow among the communist states mostly. Polish issues did not make the news. I, doc. It seems that the important role played by Walter Ulbricht in making the decision to intervene was better noticed by the West German politicians than by the journalists.

It was also mentioned by Chancellor Kiesinger, who deemed it to be an important, but not critical, factor in the decision to intervene, because Moscow would not let itself be manipulated to such a degree Other sources point out that Ulbricht was reluctant to go beyond political pressure for fear of damaging his image and his campaign for international recognition II, doc. Source: Haus der Geschichte, Bonn. Author: Peter Leger. Even before the strikes in August , Der Spiegel asked whether the crisis in Poland would lead to similar social unrest as had occurred in , , and and whether it would provoke a nervous Soviet reaction and intervention.

These questions were asked in when the crisis and resistance against the communist authorities continued to grow This question also kept recurring in subsequent months and years. The Prague Spring continued to recur as a reference point because it was a pre-Solidarity crisis which had shaken the Soviet bloc. This gave rise to making associations between the two and thus to questions regarding the earlier intervention in Czechoslovakia and its possible repetition in Poland.

Comparisons were made, between the situation of the two democratic movements in the Eastern bloc in an attempt to draw a conclusion as to whether the threats from Moscow may materialise, which is to say, whether it was possible that Moscow would react to Solidarity in the same manner as it had done to the Prague Spring. The intervention was perceived primarily as a mechanism aimed at maintaining the cohesion of the Eastern bloc. The change was too small to form a conclusion that the anti-Semitic campaign had been interrupted, but it was perceptible.

In , the emigration of the Jews from Poland continued. It was not only closely observed both by the diplomats and the mass media but was also watched with great attention in Germany and the Scandinavian countries. Immediately following the events of March, anti-Semitism was considered as an element of the policy on the part of the authorities in Warsaw and as a tool of the intra-party power struggle. Then, it was even more strongly associated with the issue of anti-Semitism in Poland. Related disputes escalated in late and early During that time, the international context also changed.

In , the attention of the media and diplomats was focused on the events in Czechoslovakia and the policy on the part of Moscow. The wave of emotions after the intervention slowly calmed down, sanctions were discontinued and attempts were made to return to the politics of detente. In March , the Declaration of Budapest 17th March , which appealed for a European Security Conference to be set up, was published. The policy of European states aimed at this direction. The successive escalation of anti-Semitic speeches and of emigration from Poland attracted the attention of the international public opinion.

After being dampened down in July, the recurrence of the anti-Semitic rhetoric in Poland had already been noted by observers after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. It resulted in the number of Jews leave the country, which increased to around two hundred per month In this assessment, the propaganda disseminated by the Polish authorities attempted to marginalise the accusations of anti-Semitism, to present them as tendentious and slanderous and to draw the attention to other issues. Its authors quoted part of a Polish Radio programme from 3rd December Now, when certain signs of detente can be seen both in Europe as a whole, as well as between Poland and Western Germany, they are put at risk in order to poison the new climate.

It is known who is set on this and who is, in fact, exploiting this campaign. It also quoted another Polish Radio programme, this time from 19th December, which emphasised the threat to the detente in Europe in even stronger terms: [ According to the Polish press, the general attack on Poland in the Western media was a planned and well-organised campaign rather than an accident The study quoted here claimed that, under the approach adopted by the Polish propaganda, Poland was unable to accept the accusations of anti-Semitism articulated in Germany.

According to Warsaw, the Germans had already levelled such allegations against the Poles during the barbaric German occupation. Now, when swastikas were being painted on synagogues in the FRG, attempts were being made to divert attention from the racism existing in the FRG itself. Opponents of the recognition of the border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers were being equated with those who accused Poland of anti-Semitism. It consisted of discrediting the Western journalists who criticised the discrimination against the Jews in Poland.

The Foreign Ministry in Bonn did not quite know how to react to the events in Poland and the commentaries on them published in the West German media. On the one hand, it was not possible to ignore the indignation of Western public opinion, which was, of course, particularly visible in the media. The article referred to here is A. In the summary, he emphasised that, [ The reaction of the largest part of the Polish public opinion is, at its best, indifferent; in its majority, however, it supports [the emigration of the Jews — PM]. Moreover, he clearly called Bonn to approve the emigration to the FRG for those wishing to leave.

This would certainly have required a departure from the standard procedures, as the consideration of a visa application was a lengthy process Reich ziehen. He had, however, put the anti-Jewish purges to an end, apart from the one which took place in the Ministry of the Interior. The report went on to say that, in June , under the pressure exerted by the so-called Partisans, he had come to the conclusion that he would have to use political anti-Semitism himself as a tool in the power struggle; this, however, provided the Partisans with an impulse to launch the anti- -Zionist campaign.

This resulted in the purges in every area of social and political life, albeit that they did not affect everyone of Jewish origin. The little time left by the authorities between the issue of a travel document and its expiry date made the formal obtaining of a visa to the states of the West impossible. In this situation, it was the Danish and Swedish authorities who were extending a helping hand Moreover, he suggested that any comparisons to the III Reich were exaggerated, bearing in mind that they were being applied to Poland where, after an end was put to the most radical part of the campaign in , subtler forms of discrimination, often invisible to an observer remaining on the outside, were brought into play in order to compel people to emigrate.

Apart from that, the authorities could count on support on the part of the majority of society. From 46 Ibidem. The problem of Polish anti- Semitism was to recur, however, even after , which is to say, after the ruling group in Warsaw changed. This emerged, inter alia, in , when the thirtieth anniversary of the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto was commemorated. The commemoration did not trigger emotions comparable to those which had arisen earlier. The reporter described this as a mark of a new climate, wherein such insinuations now resulted in a court trial rather than persecution by the secret services and emigration.

However, these issues failed to disappear from the media, which continued to persist as a thorn in their reports from Poland. The disturbances were quelled by militia units and volunteers from among the army reservists, the so-called worker activists. Feierlichkeiten aus Anlass des The impact of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland on the forming of negative stereotypes of the country cannot be seen in a number of historical studies either. The entry in Russian is written in what is, essentially, the same tone.

Only a reference to the Moczar movement and his using of the anti-Zionist campaign can be found in the Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert. Europa nad dem Zweiten Weltkrieg series, Frankfurt am Main pp. Firstly, the manipulation by the communists of anti-Semitism in order to channel social discontent and maintain their grip on the helm of power, and secondly, a democratic protest quelled by force The impact of this ideology on society is also 56 Cf.

The author refers to the conclusions reached by Marcin Zaremba and Dariusz Stola. Barbara J. The anti- -Semitic hue-and-cry after March is only one of the links included in a markedly longer process. Nevertheless, she wrote of the resistance of certain social groups to the anti-Semitic propaganda. These articles have been infrequent, but in general, they have reported on the debate in Poland about the problem of anti-Semitism in a positive tone Michael Ludwig criticised the Polish authorities for their lengthy inability to cope with the provocative erecting of the crosses in the Gravel Pit and their playing on anti-Semitic feelings.

He underscored the fact that this also holds true for a part of the political milieu that led Poland to liberation from the communist system, but which is unwilling to acknowledge that, in , Moczar was able to exploit the anti-Semitism existing in society The reservations which this article gave rise to a pattern whereby, in the lack of a readiness on the part of the society to look critically at its history, any gestures made by Polish politicians seem to be suspended in a vacuum. See Appendix 2.

Mengele o. On the other hand, the nine remaining Jewish communities are thriving. In , a Jewish primary school will be opened in Warsaw and a Jewish sports club will be set up. As far as a symbiosis of Jewish and Polish culture is concerned, it seems, however, irretrievably too late In Poland, the nationalist form of communism included a strong element of anti-Semitism, which, after , became visible both in the communist party and in the society. Initially it was not resorted to in the political power struggle.

This only occurred in the changed circumstances of the growing crisis in the second half of the sixties A precise description as to what the connections between the political plane of the events and the social reaction to them looked like was also not infrequently lacking in works which aspired to the ranks of historical studies An interest was awoken in stories describing the discovery of Jewish roots previously hidden and, sometimes, after the experience of , thoroughly concealed See Appendix 4.

To all intents and purposes, the issue of those people of Jewish origin who, after the war and prior to their emigration, were actively involved in the building of the communist system, including its worst, Stalinist phase, did not appear in the press. In this approach, Bauman is presented as being a victim of the system which he had helped to create. An article which predated it by a few years and was published in connection with his being awarded the Theodore W. The articles written by Helga Hirsch, describing individual cases but primarily showing one side of the events to a reader unfamiliar with the issues in question, were heavily loaded with emotions.

The fate of another person, Liliana Hausknecht81, was portrayed in a similar vein. The emigration in was even mentioned in the short announcement at the award ceremony Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, No. As Zoja, who prefers to see the things in a positive light, describes it, she is in love with the two countries at the same time. The last sentence referred, obviously, to the years of World War II.

Hubert Torzecki described these events as being of key importance in the forming of an entire generation of people too young to remember the terror of the Stalin period, only a handful of whom were later to become involved in the opposition. One can also come across the negation of this experience, when, departing from the emphasis being put on the connection between the rise, in the sixties, of nationalism and anti-Semitism85, a thesis was articulated to the effect that, in the eighties, the events of were pushed from the collective memory in Poland in order to make it possible for the national ideology, blamed for March, to become a counterbalance to communism by means of forgetting its connection with the anti-Semitic actions The last argument seems to be among the most radical.

Jedwabne und die Folgen, Berlin — Wien One important effect of this omission is to preserve nationalism for the liberal opposition, to construct nationalism as anti-communism in reference to the strikes, by eliminating the memory of Communist-backed nationalist invectives against Jews. A good analysis comes from The article described the setting of recollections of in the context of the politics of Poland and the Czech Republic. In the case of Poland, the commentary pointed to the emphasis placed by Adam Michnik on the role of the then events as a catalyst of the birth of the opposition and to the negation of this on the right of the Polish political scene.

In an article written for Die Welt, Adam Michnik took a different position. At the same time, he defended the nationalism is alive and well, especially in the political activities of the Catholic church. See Appendix 3. Sauerland wrote that the president had belonged to the political formation which had unleashed the anti-Semitic hue-and-cry in In the subsequent years, the both domestic politics and the intervention in Czechoslovakia was recalled in order to emphasise the undemocratic nature of the system of power in the Eastern bloc and in Poland.

References to the tradition of the democratic protests of made in Poland during the Solidarity years were noticeable. Following the introduction of martial law, it was recalled that some members of the military authorities had been involved in the quelling of social protests including the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The assessment of Jaruzelski was not unambiguous. On the other hand, an observation recurrently emerged to the effect that, in , the Polish army on its own did what had required outside intervention in Czechoslovakia in A comment of this nature, be it longer or briefer, was deemed a necessary accompaniament to every item published in the press about him Net, No. In the report of his death, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. However, Karol Sauerland, the author of the article, then added that in the stormy period of , he was away from Poland and no one can know how he would have behaved upon seeing the brutal actions against the Jews, students and intellectuals Let us thus conclude with the appeal, voiced by Karol Sauerland, for the restoration of the Jews to Polish memory, which refers to an important issue also articulated in the West German press as a reproach to the Poles, a reproach in respect of the fact that, despite the enormous change which Poland has undergone, this restoration is yet to occur.

This was bluntly expressed by Sauerland, [ Die Polizei griff nicht ein. Die Regierung beschuldigte lokale Chauvinisten der Tat. Er greift nach der Macht. Kollege Novotny in Prag wich dem neuen tschechoslowakischen Liberal- -Kommunismus. Ochab wich dem — stalinistischen — Nationalkommunisten Moczar. Rosa Luxemburg und Karl Radek standen in ihren Reihen. Nationalkommunist Moczar hatte sich stets im Hintergrund gehalten. Vorsitzender der Vereinigung ehemaliger Partisanen: General Moczar.

Mehrere Theater- und Filmfachleute wurden entlassen, der weltbekannte Regisseur Alexander Ford angegriffen. Eine erste Gruppe hatte das Land schon bei Kriegsende oder kurz danach verlassen. Eine solche Reaktion hat Tradition. Bei aller Unterschiedlichkeit ist in Polen und der Tschechischen Republik das Jahr eine politische Wasserscheide. Um ihre Macht zu sichern und zumindest die Basis der Partei auf regierungstreuen Kurs zu bringen, brachte der innerste Zirkel um Gomulka eine antisemitische Kampagne ins Rollen. Nach der Wende begann Polen, die schwarzen Flecken der eigenen Geschichte anzupacken.

Einer dieser Flecken ist der Antisemitismus. Nationalistische Kreise und nationalkonservative Vertreter der Kirche leugnen jegliche katalysatorische Wirkung des Jahres Sie halten den damaligen Dissidenten vor, selbst aus der kommunistischen Partei zu kommen und deshalb kompromittiert zu sein.

Die Entmythisierung hat begonnen. Auf Anordnung Moskaus wurde die Tschechoslowakei auf Linie gebracht. Diese theoretischen Fragen dringen aber kaum in breite Teile der Gesellschaft vor. Eine tiefgreifende Auseinandersetzung mit der kommunistischen Vergangenheit fehlt. Als am Ich traute meinen Augen nicht. All diese jungen Menschen wurden zugleich als ehemalige Stalinisten beziehungsweise als Kinder von solchen bezeichnet.

Andere hatte ich bei ihren Auftritten erlebt. Der Danziger Bahnhof in Warschau war der Ort, von dem aus sie sich nach Wien begaben, um von dort aus nach Israel, in die Vereinigten Staaten oder auch in die Bundesrepublik weiterzureisen. Ich war mehrmals auf diesem Bahnhof, um Bekannte zu verabschieden. Beide hatten kurz nach dem 8.

Unvergesslich bleibt mir der Besuch bei Kolakowski. Es muss im Oktober gewesen sein. Ich fragte ihn, was er jetzt mache. Er antwortete, er lese Paracelsus, um der Sprache Heideggers auf die Spur zu kommen. Es war keine theatralische Geste, sondern entsprach seinem damaligen Charakter.