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Boston: MIT Press. Research Program Abstract : In our ongoing interdisciplinary research in Cognitive and Social Sciences we set out to investigate in what sense the normative claims of a social, political constructivism Rawls and of a formal, pragmatic reconstruction Habermas may be taken as instances of a weak or mitigated methodological social constructionism to the extent that both preserve the idea of objectivity in terms of a cognitivist view of moral normativity, without falling back into intuitionist realism and avoiding scientism, positivism, and reductionist versions of naturalism.
According to Habermas's weak naturalism, nature and culture are continuous with one another, hence an upshot of such a conception of social evolution is that societies evolve to a higher level only when learning occurs with respect to their normative structures. Weak naturalism allows thus for social evolutionary processes guided by normative claims, in both reflexive and social terms, with a view to realizing universalizable, valid normative claims that are justified from the moral standpoint, always generated through a reflective equilibrium, broadly conceived.
As opposed to the simplistic dismissal of phenomenological, hermeneutical approaches to social evolution as being too intuitionist, unscientific, and irrational, as insinuated by rational-choice theorists such as Mario Bunge , naturalism must face the normative challenges inherent in lifeworldly, reflexive practices of human agency, as Christine Korsgaard's seminal works on normativity, autonomy, and selfhood have so brilliantly shown.
Precisely because we must overcome the dualisms that oppose phenomena to noumena, facts to values, and the physical, natural world to the social, cultural norms, the neurophilosophy advocated by philosophers such as Patricia Churchland and neuroscientists like Antonio Damasio have paved the way for a proficuous interaction between naturalism and normative, social sciences.
On this view, naturalism does not eliminate normativity but actually renders it reasonable, defensible, and sustainable, in articulating both biological evolution and social evolution, so as to meet the challenges of cultural relativism and the pluralism of perspectival semantic contexts without giving up on a conception of normativity --albeit not absolutist --, supporting the approach of new interfaces that can encompass the differences between mitigated conceptions of naturalism and cognitive, empirical takes on culture.
Although Churchland's naturalist version of eliminativism regarding folk psychology can be consistent with some types of functionalism, she refuses early functionalist theories such as Putnam's "machine state functionalism" and subsequent externalist variants and criticisms for describing functional states in normative or propositional reasoning as if they were inherently normative or ontologically capable of accounting for the mind-brain relationship, as in the misleading software-hardware analogy. In the same vein, Jesse Prinz's highly original conception of transformation naturalism "a view about how we change our views" and his seminal takes on concept empriricism, his Jamesian-inspired, perceptualist theory of emotions and half-Humean, half-Nietzschean emotionalist constructivism avoids classic, aporetic positions in moral realism and hastily dismissed versions of ethical relativism.
Both Damasio's embodied-cognitivist theory of emotions and Prinz's relativist, emotional theory of morals seem indeed to favor such constructivist takes on social philosophy and help us make a case for exposing the normative and phenomenological deficits that characterize extreme views that either lack the normative, binding force of social, moral rules or overlook the moral neutrality of evolution, avoiding thus the physicalism of classic naturalism Quine and the intuitionism of Platonic moral realism Moore , rationalistic innatism Chomsky and the postmodern, radical versions of social constructionists, rightly denounced by social epistemology as revisionism.
Overall, what I dubbed "the phenomenological deficit of critical theory" unveils the naturalist correlation of the ontological, linguistic, and intersubjective axes of sociobiological evolution, insofar as it preserves the normative force of a reasonable account of the evolution of morals. Cognitivist and noncognitivist arguments alike are thus to be revisited and reviewed as Churchland, Damasio, and Prinz reject the kinds of functionalism and reductionism that minimize the importance of embodied, social processes and point to both cognitive and noncognitive features in their naturalist analyses of the mind-brain, passions, sentiments, emotions, consciousness, selfhood, and morals, resulting in a mitigated or weak naturalism that avoids both eliminativism which Prinz calls "naturism" and a strong culturalism "nurturism" , extreme positions of the nature-nurture pickle.
Hence, according to Churchland , p. Korsgaard recasts constructivist features of normative realism, as she critically revisits Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche, exploring the innovative accounts of Reflective Endorsement and the Appeal to Autonomy so as to make a case for a procedural normative realism. We come thus full circle, as we propose to review intriguing, polemical issues of normativity and naturalism at the crossroads between critical theory and neuroscience, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
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MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN hardcover: alk. Creative ability in science. Model-based reasoning. Discoveries in science. See also specific processes Barker, Peter, , Adaptation, Barsalou, Lawrence, —, — Aether, 49—50, 59 Biological processes, Affordances, attunement to, — Biomedical engineering laboratories, Amodal symbols, 98 Analogical reasoning, 20 Bio-robotics laboratories, Analogy, —, , , n5, Bird, concept of, — n7 Boden, Margaret, 15 diagrammatic representations and, Bootstrapping processes, , —, — experimental research on, — Boyle, Robert, n16 mapping and transfer, —, retrieval, —, Carey, Susan, implications for, — Categorization processes, Maxwell vs.
H-creative ideas, 15 Cognitive-historical analysis, 5, Creative inference, 12 Cognitive-historical method, 6—10 Cultural-cognitive system, scientific Cognitive science, xi thinking as, 8 Cognitive systems, Curricula innovations, model-based, Coil, See also Polygonal coil; — Torsion, recognizing horizontal, 78—80 Deductive reasoning, 11 Computational vs.
See Duhem, P. See Forces 51, 53, , field concept for see Field concept Copernican hypothesis, , Electromagnetic theory, x. See also Coupled system, , , See also under Faraday; Maxwell Internal-external representational Electrostatics.
See Aether Greeno, J. P-creative ideas, 15 on lines of force, 22—23, 25, 27, Hybrid models, 51—52, 55, 81, n3 — Hybrid representations, 28 Maxwell and, 19, 22—26, 28—30, 38, Hypothesis generation, 66 — Hypothetico-deductive method, 11 unified representation of electricity, magnetism, and motion, 23—26 Iconic aspects of representations, 97— Faraday to Einstein Nersessian , 21 , , n2 Feigl, Herbert, 2 Idealization, 56, Ferguson, Eugene, Ideomotor theory, Feynman, Richard, 91 Idle wheel particles, Field concept, x, 5, 10, 19, — Idle wheels.
See also Vortex—idle wheel Flexible rod, 67—73 introduction of, 36, — Forbus, Kenneth, — Imagery, —, —, n6 Force, lines of, 22—27, — kinesthetic, Forces Images, relational structures among, 39 Imagistic representation s , 97, , representations of, 19 see also — Maxwell cognitive research on diagrammatic Formulaic representations, 97 representations, — Fortress—tumor analogy problem, , discovering electromagnetic wave , , , propagation, — recognizing torsion, — Gadow, H.
See Imagery Naturalist perspective, 4—5 Mental modeling,